ABSTRACT
Abstract This paper offers a five-part framework for assessing why the United Kingdom has coped poorly compared with peer countries with the medical, social and economic challenges brought by the COVID-19 pandemic ? a surprising failure, given the strength of its scientific community and the internationally attested quality of its civil service. The paper also offers a proposal for how to shape an independent inquiry, one promised by the UK Prime Minister, of the kind that has the primary motivation to better prepare the country for future crises. The paper begins by providing various metrics that set out how the UK has, as of late 2020, been particularly adversely affected by the pandemic. It then details the five-part framework, which is presented as a series of propositions with initial supporting evidence that require more thorough investigation, supported by a fuller record of evidence. First, we suggest that there have been problems as to how evidence about the pandemic and its anticipated effects was collected, processed and circulated, weakening policymakers? ability to evaluate the risk calculus. Second, particular structures and processes of government decision-making appear to have been inadequate and ill-suited to the multidimensional challenges brought by the pandemic. Third, the role of political leadership and decision-making in the public health and broader policy responses needs thorough evaluation. Fourth, we assess some aspects of economic policymaking during the pandemic. Fifth, features of the UK's institutional make-up may have been a driver of the suboptimal outcomes. Overall, we argue that UK policymakers may have over-relied on the medical sciences at the expense of other (social) scientific evidence.